We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes: the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.
Introduction
Consider a set of agents who have to collectively choose an alternative. Each agent has a preference relation on the set of alternatives. We would like the chosen alternative to depend on the preference profile (a list of preference relations, one for each agent), but preference relations are private information and, to be used to choose the alternative, they have to be revealed by the agents. A social choice function collects individual preference relations and selects an alternative for each declared preference profile. Hence, a social choice function induces a game form that generates, at every preference profile, a strategic problem to each agent. An agent manipulates a social choice function if there exist a preference profile and a different preference relation for the agent such that, if submitted, the social choice function selects a strictly better alternative according to the preference relation of the agent of the original preference profile. A social choice function is strategy-proof if no agent can manipulate it. That is, the game form induced by a strategy-proof social choice function has the property that, at every preference profile, declaring the true preference relation is a weakly dominant strategy for all agents. Hence, each agent has an optimal strategy (to tell the truth) that is independent of the agent's beliefs about the other agents' declared preference relations. This absence of any informational hypothesis about the others' preference relations is one of the main reasons why strategy-proofness is an extremely desirable property of social choice functions.
However, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem establishes that nontrivial strategyproof social choice functions do not exist on universal domains. Strategy-proofness is a strong requirement since a social choice function is no longer strategy-proof as soon as there exist a preference profile and an agent that can manipulate the social choice function by submitting another preference relation that if submitted, causes the social choice function to select another alternative that is strictly preferred by the agent. Nevertheless, there are many social choice problems where the structure of the set of alternatives restricts the set of conceivable preference relations, and hence the set of strategies available to agents, for instance, when the set of alternatives has a natural order in which all agents agree. The localization of a public facility, the temperature of a room, the platform of political parties in the left-right spectrum, or the income tax rate are all examples of such structures that impose natural restrictions on agents' preference relations. Black (1948) was the first to argue that in those cases agents' preference relations have to be single-peaked (relative to the unanimous order on the set of alternatives). A preference relation is single-peaked if there exists a top alternative that is strictly preferred to all other alternatives and at each of the two sides of the top alternative the preference relation is monotonic, increasing in the left, and decreasing in the right.
A social choice function operating only on a restricted domain of preference profiles may become strategy-proof. The elimination of preference profiles restricts the normal form game induced by the social choice function, and strategies (i.e., preference relations) that were not dominant may become dominant. Consider any social choice problem where the set of alternatives can be identified with the interval [a b] of real numbers and where single-peaked preference relations are defined on [a b]. For this setup Moulin (1980) characterizes all strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preference relations as the class of all generalized median voter schemes. 1 In addition, Moulin (1980) also characterizes the subclass of median voter schemes as the set of all strategy-proof, tops-only, and anonymous social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preference relations, and this is indeed a large class of social choice functions. A median voter scheme can be identified with a vector x = (x 1 x n+1 ) of n + 1 numbers in [a b], where n is the cardinality of the set of agents N and x 1 ≤ · · · ≤ x n+1 . Then, for each preference profile, the median voter scheme identified with x selects the alternative that is the median among the n top alternatives of the agents and the n + 1 fixed numbers x 1 x n+1 . Since 2n + 1 is an odd number, this median always exists and belongs to [a b] . Observe that median voter schemes are tops-only and anonymous by definition. They are strategy-proof on the domain of single-peaked preference relations because, given a preference profile, each agent can only change the chosen alternative by moving his declared top away from his true top; thus, no agent can manipulate a median voter scheme at any preference profile. A median voter scheme distributes the power to influence the outcome among agents according to its associated vector x in an anonymous way. Generalized median voter schemes constitute non-anonymous extensions of median voter schemes. A generalized median voter scheme can be identified with a set of fixed ballots {p S } S⊆N on [a b], one for each subset of agents S. Then, for each preference profile, the generalized median voter scheme identified with {p S } S⊆N selects the alternative α that is the smallest one with the following two properties: (i) there is a subset of agents S whose top alternatives are smaller than or equal to α and (ii) the fixed ballot p S associated to S is also smaller than or equal to α.
Generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof on the domain of singlepeaked preference profiles, but are manipulable on the universal domain. There are several papers that have identified, in our or similar settings, maximal domains under which social choice functions are strategy-proof, but as soon as the domain is enlarged with a preference outside the domain, the social choice function becomes manipulable. Barberà et al. (1998) , Barberà et al. (1991) , Berga and Serizawa (2000) , Bochet and Storcken (2009) , Ching and Serizawa (1998) , Hatsumi et al. (2014) , Kalai and Müller (1977) , and Serizawa (1995) are some examples of these papers. Our contribution in this paper builds on this literature and has the objective of giving criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We want to emphasize the fact that the manipulability of a social choice function does not indicate the degree of its lack of strategy-proofness. There may be only one instance at which the social choice function is manipulable or there may be many such instances. The mechanism design literature that has focused on strategy-proofness has not distinguished between these two situations; it has declared that both social choice functions are not strategy-proof, period! 2 Our criterion to compare two social choice functions takes the point of view of individual agents. We say that an agent is able to manipulate a social choice function at a preference relation (the true one) if there exist preference relations, one for each of the other agents and another for the agent (the strategic one) such that if submitted, the agent obtains a strictly better alternative according to the true preference relation. Consider two generalized median voter schemes, f and g, that can operate on the universal domain of preference profiles. Assume that for each agent the set of preference relations under which the agent is able to manipulate f is contained in the set of preference relations under which the agent is able to manipulate g. Then, from the point of view of all agents, g is more manipulable than f . Hence, we think that f is unambiguously a better generalized median voter scheme than g according to the strategic incentives induced to the agents. Often, it may be reasonable to think that agents' preferences are single-peaked, but if the designer foresees that agents also may have non-single-peaked preferences, then f may be a better choice than g if strategic incentives are relevant and important to the designer.
Before presenting our general result in Theorem 2, we focus on median voter schemes, the subclass of anonymous generalized median voter schemes. In Theorem 1 we provide two necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two median voter schemes in terms of their manipulability. Let f and g be two (nonconstant) median voter schemes and let x = (x 1 x n+1 ) and y = (y 1 y n+1 ) be their associated vectors of fixed ballots, x to f and y to g, where x 1 ≤ · · · ≤ x n+1 and y 1 ≤ · · · ≤ y n+1 . Then g is at least as manipulable as f if and only if [x 1 x n+1 ] ⊂ [y 1 y n+1 ] and [x 2 x n ] ⊂ [y 2 y n ]. Using this characterization we are able to establish simple comparability tests for the subclass of unanimous and efficient median voter schemes. Using the partial order "to be equally manipulable as" obtained in Theorem 1, we show that the set of equivalence classes of median voter schemes has a complete lattice structure with the partial order "to be as manipulable as"; the supremum is the equivalence class containing all median voter schemes with x 1 = x 2 = a and x n = x n+1 = b, 3 and the infimum is the equivalence class with all constant median voter schemes; i.e., for all k = 1 n + 1,
In Theorem 2 we provide three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their manipulability. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcome of the two generalized median voter schemes (i.e., the intervals of alternatives where agents are non-dummies). Obviously, Theorem 2 is more general than Theorem 1. However, our analysis can be sharper and deeper on the subclass of anonymous generalized median voter schemes. In addition, Theorem 1 can be seen as a first step to better understand the general characterization of Theorem 2.
Before finishing this Introduction, we want to relate our comparability notion to two notions recently used in centralized matching markets. Pathak and Sönmez (2013) proposed two different notions to compare, in terms of their manipulability, specific matching mechanisms in school choice problems. The two notions are related in the sense that one is stronger than the other, and both are based on the inclusion of preference profiles at which there exists a manipulation. In contrast, our notion is based on the inclusion of preference relations at which an agent is able to manipulate. In applications, preference profiles are not common knowledge while each agent knows his preference relation (and he may only know that). To use a more manipulable generalized median voter scheme means that each agent has to worry about his potential capacity to manipulate in a larger set. Again, using the inclusion of preference relations as a basic criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability does not require any informational hypothesis. Thus, we find it more appealing. Moreover, we show that if two generalized median voter schemes are comparable according to Pathak and Sönmez's weaker notion, then they are also comparable according to our notion. Furthermore, Example 1 shows that our notion is indeed much weaker than Pathak and Sönmez's weaker notion (and hence, also weaker than their stronger one).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminary notation and definitions. Section 3 describes the family of anonymous generalized median voter schemes and compares them according to their manipulability. Section 4 extends the analysis to all generalized median voter schemes. Section 5 contains a final remark about the use of median voter schemes on the universal domain of preferences and the comparison of Pathak and Sönmez's criteria with ours. Two appendices collect all omitted proofs.
Preliminaries
Agents are the elements of a finite set N = {1
n}. The set of alternatives is the interval of real numbers [a b] ⊆ R. We assume that n ≥ 2 and a < b. Generic agents will be denoted by i and j, and generic alternatives will be denoted by α and β. Subsets of agents will be represented by S and T .
The (weak) preference of each agent i ∈ N on the set of alternatives [a b] is a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relation (a complete pre-order) R i on [a b]. As usual, let P i and I i denote the strict and indifference preference relations induced by R i , respectively; namely, for all α β ∈ [a b], α P i β if and only if ¬β R i α, and α I i β if and only if α R i β and β R i α. The top of R i is the set of alternatives that are weakly preferred to any other alternative. We will restrict our attention to preferences with a unique top, which will be denoted by τ(R i ); i.e., τ(R i ) P i α for all α ∈ [a b] \ {τ(R i )}. Let U be the set of preferences with a unique top on [a b]. A preference profile R = (R 1 R n ) ∈ U n is an n-tuple of preferences. To emphasize the role of agent i or subset of agents S, a preference profile R will be represented by (R i R −i ) or (R S R −S ), respectively.
A subsetÛ n ⊆ U n of preference profiles (or the setÛ itself ) will be called a domain. A social choice function is a function f :Û n → [a b] selecting an alternative for each preference profile in the domainÛ n . The range of a social choice function f :Û n → [a b] is denoted by r f . That is,
Social choice functions require each agent to report a preference on a domainÛ . A social choice function is strategy-proof onÛ if it is always in the best interest of agents to reveal their preferences truthfully. Formally, a social choice function f :Û n → [a b] is strategy-proof if for all R ∈Û n , all i ∈ N, and all R i ∈Û ,
In the sequel we will say that a social choice function f :
To compare social choice functions according to their manipulability, our reference set of preferences will be the full set U . The set of manipulable preferences of agent i ∈ N for f :
we write (i) f g to denote that f is at least as manipulable as g, (ii) f ≈ g to denote that f is equally manipulable as g, and (iii) f g to denote that f is more manipulable than g. Obviously, there are many pairs of social choice functions that cannot be compared according to their manipulability.
Strategy-proofness is not the unique property we will look at. A social choice function f :Û n → [a b] is anonymous if it is invariant with respect to the agents' names; namely, for all one-to-one mappings σ :
In our setting the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that a social choice function f : U n → [a b], with #r f = 2, is strategy-proof if and only if it is dictatorial (see Barberà and Peleg 1990 ). An implicit assumption is that the social choice function operates on all preference profiles on U n , because all of them are reasonable. However, for many applications, a linear order structure on the set of alternatives naturally induces a domain restriction in which, for each preference R i in the domain, not only does there exist a unique top but also at each of the sides of the top of R i the preference is monotonic. A well known domain restriction is the set of single-peaked preferences on an interval of real numbers.
We will denote the domain of all single-peaked preferences on [a b] by SP ⊂ U . Moulin (1980) characterizes the family of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. This family contains many nondictatorial social choice functions. All of them are extensions of the median voter. Following Moulin (1980) , and before presenting the general result, we first compare in Section 3, the anonymous subclass according to their manipulability on the full domain of preferences U . In Section 4 we will give a general result to compare, according to their manipulability, all strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on SP n when they operate on the domain U n .
3. Anonymity: Comparing median voter schemes
Median voter schemes
Assume first that n is odd and let f : U n → [a b] be the social choice function that selects, for each preference profile R = (R 1 R n ) ∈ U n , the median among the top alternatives of the n agents; namely, f (R) = med{τ(R 1 ) τ(R n )}. 4 This social choice function is anonymous, efficient, tops-only, and strategy-proof on SP. Now add to the n agents' top alternatives, n + 1 fixed ballots: (n + 1)/2 ballots at alternative a and (n + 1)/2 ballots at alternative b. Then the median among the n top alternatives, and the median among the n top alternatives and the n + 1 fixed ballots coincide since the (n + 1)/2 ballots at a and the (n + 1)/2 ballots at b cancel each other; namely, for all
To proceed, and instead of adding n + 1 fixed ballots at the extremes of the interval, we can add, regardless of whether n is odd or even, n + 1 fixed ballots at any of the alter-
Hence, each median voter scheme can be identified with its vector x = (x 1 x n+1 ) ∈ [a b] n+1 of fixed ballots. Moulin (1980) shows that the class of all tops-only, anonymous, and strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences coincides with all median voter schemes.
Proposition 1 (Moulin 1980 
4 Given a set of real numbers {x 1 x K }, where K is odd, define its median as med{x 1
Since K is odd, the median is unique and belongs to the set {x 1 x K }.
Median voter schemes are tops-only and anonymous by definition. To see that they are strategy-proof, let f : SP n → [a b] be any median voter scheme and fix R ∈ SP n and i ∈ N. If f (R) = τ(R i ), i cannot manipulate f . Assume τ(R i ) < f (R) (the other case is symmetric). Agent i can only modify the chosen alternative by declaring a preference R i ∈ SP with the property that f (R) < τ(R i ).
. Thus, i cannot manipulate f . It is less immediate to see that the set of all median voter schemes (one for each vector of n + 1 fixed ballots) coincides with the class of all tops-only, anonymous, and strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. The key point in the proof is to identify, given a tops-only, anonymous, and strategy-proof social choice function f :
of fixed ballots. To identify each x k with 1 ≤ k ≤ n+1, consider any preference profile R ∈ SP n with the property that #{i ∈ N | τ(R i ) = a} = n − k + 1 and #{i ∈ N | τ(R i ) = b} = k − 1, and define x k = f (R). The proof concludes by checking that indeed f satisfies (2) with this vector
To see that in the statement of Proposition 1 tops-onlyness does not follow from strategy-proofness and anonymity, consider the social choice function f :
where for all R ∈ SP n ,
Notice that f is strategy-proof and anonymous but it is not tops-only. It also violates efficiency, unanimity, and ontoness. We finish this subsection with a useful remark stating that median voter schemes are monotonic. Remark 1. Let f : U n → [a b] be a median voter scheme and let R R ∈ U n be such that
Main result with anonymity
Median voter schemes are strategy-proof on the domain SP n of single-peaked preferences. However, when they operate on the larger domain U n they may become manipulable. Then all median voter schemes are equivalent from the classical manipulability point of view. In this subsection we give a simple test to compare two median voter schemes according to their manipulability. Given a vector x = (x 1 x n+1 ) ∈ [a b] n+1 , we will denote by f x its associated median voter scheme on U n ; namely, for all R ∈ U n ,
, we will assume that x 1 ≤ · · · ≤ x n+1 . This can be done without loss of generality because the social choice function associated to any reordering of the components of x coincides with f x . Obviously, the range of f x is [x 1 x n+1 ], i.e., r f x = [x 1 x n+1 ]. Any constant social choice function, f (R) = α for all R ∈ U n , can be described as a median voter scheme by setting, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n + 1, x k = α. We denote it by f α . Trivially, any constant social choice function f α is strategyproof on U n . Then, for any α ∈ [a b] and any social choice function g : U n → [a b], we have that g is at least as manipulable as f α (i.e., g f α ). Furthermore, all nonconstant median voter schemes are manipulable on U n . Hence, any nonconstant median voter scheme f x is more manipulable than f α (i.e., f x f α ). Theorem 1 below gives an easy and operative way to compare nonconstant median voter schemes according to their manipulability.
be two vectors of fixed ballots such that f x and f y are not constant; i.e., x 1 < x n+1 and y 1 < y n+1 . Then f y is at least as manipulable as f x if and only if [
The formal proof of Theorem 1 is left for the next subsection, but we now give some intuition about it. Whether or not agent i can manipulate f x at R i roughly depends on the set of alternatives that may be selected by f x for some subprofile R −i , given R i (this set is called the set of options left open by R i ). How R i compares pairs of alternatives that will never be selected by f x once R i is submitted is unrelated to the ability of i to manipulate f x . Moreover, given f x , the set of options left open by R i depends only on x 1 , x 2 , x n , and x n+1 , and it does in a very particular way: the closer x 1 and x 2 are to a, and x n and x n+1 are to b, the larger the options left open by R i will be and, hence, i will be able to manipulate f x easily. And finally, R i has to be single-peaked on the set of options left open by itself, because otherwise there would exists R −i such that i is able to induce a preferred alternative further away from his top τ(R i ) by declaring another preference R i .
Proof of Theorem 1
In the proof of Theorem 1 the following option set will play a fundamental role.
If f x is a median voter scheme, we denote o f x (R i ) by o x (R i ).
Before proving Theorem 1 we state three useful lemmata, whose proofs are given in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 plays a key role in the proof of Theorem 1. To understand it, notice that it roughly says that whether or not agent i can manipulate f x at R i depends on the fact that R i should only be single-peaked on the set of alternatives that may be selected by f x for some subprofile R −i , given R i . The comparison, in terms of R i , of pairs of alternatives that will never be selected once R i is submitted is irrelevant in terms of agent i's power to manipulate f x . To illustrate that, consider the case where n = 3,
. Lemma 1 says that R i should be single-peaked on this interval and that the preference away from τ(R i ) toward the direction of (a + b)/3 has to be monotonically decreasing until alternative (a + b)/3, and that all alternatives further away have to be worse than (a + b)/3 but they can be freely ordered among themselves and symmetrically from τ(R i ) toward the direction of 2(a + b)/3. Figure 1 illustrates a preference that is single-peaked on o x (R i ) ∪ {τ(R i ) α} for all α ∈ r f x . It also shows that this set may be significantly larger than the set of single-peaked preferences.
Proof of Theorem 1. First, we will prove that if
. Therefore, f y is at least as manipulable as f x . To prove the other implication, assume that f y is at least as manipulable as f x . Hence,
To obtain a contradiction, assume that [
We will divide the proof between two cases.
In particular, suppose that x 1 < y 1 ; the proof for the case y n+1 < x n+1 proceeds similarly and is therefore omitted. We will divide the proof between two cases again, depending on whether Figure 1 . Single-peaked preference on the relevant set.
Case 1.1:
Hence, and since τ(R i ) β γ ∈ o x (R i ) and (ii) holds, R i is not single-peaked on o x (P i ) and, for all α ∈ r f y ,
Thus, by Lemma 1,
i , which contradicts (3). Case 1.2: x 1 = x 2 . Since f x is not constant and x 1 < y 1 , x 1 < min{y 1 x n+1 }. Let α β γ ∈ [a b] be such that x 1 < α < β < γ < min{y 1 x n+1 } and let R i ∈ U be such that (i) τ(R i ) = γ, (ii) α P i β, and (iii) if ρ δ ∈ [a b] and y 1 < ρ < δ, then ρ P i δ. Since x 1 < τ(R i ) < y 1 and
Hence, and since α β τ(
In particular, suppose that x 2 < y 2 ; the proof for the case y n < x n proceeds similarly and therefore is omitted. Let α β ∈ [a b] be such that x 2 < α < β < (x 2 + y 2 )/2 < y 2 and let R i ∈ U be such that (i) τ(R i ) = (x 2 + y 2 )/2, (ii) α P i β, and (iii) if γ δ ∈ [a b] and τ(R i ) < γ < δ, then γ P i δ. Since
For further reference, let MVS denote the set of all median voting schemes from U n to [a b]. An immediate consequence of Theorem 1 is that if median voter scheme f is at least as manipulable as median voter scheme g, then the range of g is contained in the range of f . The improvement in terms of the strategy-proofness of median voter schemes necessarily requires the corresponding reduction of their ranges since smaller ranges reduce agents' power to manipulate. Corollary 1 below, which follows from Theorem 1 and the fact that for all f x ∈ MVS, r f x = [x 1 x n+1 ], states this observation formally.
Consider a problem where the range of the social choice has to be fixed a priori to be a subinterval 
Unanimity
According to Proposition 1 in Moulin (1980) , a median voter scheme
is efficient (on the single-peaked domain) if and only if x 1 = a and x n+1 = b; namely, f x can be described as the median of the n top alternatives submitted by the agents and only n − 1 fixed ballots since x 1 = a and x n+1 = b cancel each other in (2). But this subclass of median voter schemes is appealing because it coincides with the class of all unanimous median voter schemes (MVS [a b] using the notation introduced in the previous subsection). 5 Corollary 3 below shows that Theorem 1 has clear implications on how unanimous and non-unanimous median voter schemes can be ordered according to their manipulability. In particular, given a unanimous median voter scheme, there is always a non-unanimous median voter scheme that is less manipulable. Moreover, if a unanimous median voter scheme and a non-unanimous median voter scheme are comparable according to their manipulability, then the former is more manipulable than the later.
Corollary 3. Let f y ∈ MVS be unanimous. Proof. Let f y ∈ MVS be unanimous. Hence, y 1 = a and y n+1 = b.
(a) The statement follows immediately from Theorem 1.
(b) We distinguish between two cases. Case 1: Assume y 2 < y n and let α β γ ∈ [a b] be such that y 2 < α < β < γ < y n . Con-
. By Theorem 1, f y is at least as manipulable as f x and since [y 2 y n ] [x 2 x n ], f x is not at least as manipulable as f y . Hence, f y is more manipulable than f x , and f x is neither constant nor unanimous since a < x 1 < x n+1 < b.
Case 2: Assume y 2 = y n . Furthermore, suppose that a < y 2 ; the proof when y n < b proceeds symmetrically and therefore is omitted. Let α ∈ (a y 2 ) and consider
, f x is not at least as manipulable as f y . Hence, f y is more manipulable than f x . Furthermore, and since a < x 1 = · · · = x n < x n+1 = b, f x is neither constant nor unanimous.
(c) Assume
. By Theorem 1, f x is not at least as manipulable as f y . Furthermore, as f x and f y are comparable, f y f x must hold.
We conclude this subsection with a corollary that identifies the unanimous median voter schemes that do not admit a less manipulable unanimous median voter scheme. The statement also follows immediately from Theorem 1.
Corollary 4. Let f y be a unanimous median voter scheme such that y 2 = y n . Then there does not exist an unanimous median voting scheme g such that f y g.
Efficiency
A median voter scheme f x : U n → [a b] (operating on the full domain of preferences) is efficient if and only if x 1 = a, x n+1 = b, and x k ∈ {a b} for all 2 ≤ k ≤ n. 6 This is because on the larger domain, if a median voter scheme f x has an interior fixed ballot x k ∈ (a b), it is always possible to find a preference profile R with f x (R) = x k such that there exists an alternative y that is unanimously strictly preferred by all agents; namely, y P i f x (R) for all i ∈ N. Moreover, all efficient median voter schemes are unanimous. 6 Hence, an efficient median voter scheme f x : U n → [a b] has the property that for all
We now present simple criteria that are useful to compare efficient median voter schemes with other unanimous median voter schemes according to their manipulability. But before, we need a bit of additional notation.
Let k be an integer such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n and (α 1 α n ) ∈ [a b] n . Denote by π k (α 1 α n ) the kth ranked number; namely,
We denote the efficient median voter scheme f x with k fixed ballots at a by f k .
be an efficient median voter scheme such that k / ∈ {1 n}. Then the following statements hold.
(e) There exists a non-efficient and unanimous f x ∈ MVS such that f k f x .
Corollary 5 says the following. Statement (a) states that any efficient median voter scheme f / ∈ {f 1 f n } belongs to the set of the most manipulable median voter schemes. Statement (c) states that the two efficient median voter schemes f 1 and f n are less manipulable than any other efficient median voter scheme f / ∈ {f 1 f n }. Statement (d) states that any non-unanimous median voter scheme is less manipulable than any efficient median voter scheme f / ∈ {f 1 f n }. Statement (e) states that given an efficient median voter scheme f / ∈ {f 1 f n }, there is always a (non-efficient) unanimous median voter scheme that is less manipulable. Moreover, Corollary 5 has the following two implications when n is odd. First, for any f x ∈ MVS, f (n+1)/2 f x , and second, for all nonunanimous f x ∈ MVS, f (n+1)/2 f x .
Proof of Corollary 5. Let y be the vector of fixed ballots associated to f k . Since k / ∈ {1 n}, y 1 = y 2 = a and y n = y n+1 = b (4) (a) It follows from (4) and Theorem 1. (b) It follows from (a). (c) Let z be the vector of fixed ballots associated to f 1 ; namely, z 1 = a and z 2 = · · · = z n+1 = b. Hence, by (4) and Theorem 1, f k is more manipulable than f 1 . Using a similar argument, it also follows that f k f n .
(d) Let f x be a non-unanimous median voter scheme. Then either a < x 1 or x n+1 < b. Hence, by (4) and Theorem 1, f k is more manipulable than f x .
(e) Consider any α ∈ (a b) and define x = (a α α k−1 times b b). Then f x is unanimous but it is not efficient. By (4) and Theorem 1, f k f x .
Corollary 6. Let f ∈ MVS be efficient and such that f ∈ {f 1 f n }. Corollary 6 says the following. Statement (a) states that there exists a non-efficient and nonconstant median voter scheme that is less manipulable than f 1 (or f n ). Statement (b) says that if the efficient median voter scheme f 1 (or f n ) and a non-efficient median voter scheme f are comparable according to their manipulability, then the former is more manipulable than the later. Corollaries 5 and 6 make clear the well known trade-off between strategy-proofness and efficiency.
Proof of Corollary 6. Consider f 1 ∈ MVS and let y = (a b b) be its associated vector of fixed ballots. The case f n ∈ MVS proceeds symmetrically.
(a) Define x = (a α b b), where α ∈ (a b). Then, by Theorem 1, f 1 f x and it is clear that f x is non-efficient.
(b) Since [y 2 y n ] = {b}, and f x and f 1 are comparable, Theorem 1 implies that f 1 f x .
Complete lattice structure
Using Theorem 1 we can partition the set of median voter schemes MVS into equivalence classes in such a way that each equivalence class contains median voter schemes that are all equally manipulable. Denote the (quotient) set of those equivalence classes by MVS/ ≈. Furthermore, we can extend on MVS to the set of equivalence classes MVS/ ≈ in a natural way. Denote this extension by [ ]. In this subsection we will show that the pair (MVS/ ≈ [ ]) is a complete lattice; namely, any nonempty subset of equivalence classes in MVS/ ≈ has a supremum and an infimum according to [ ]. Formally, given f x ∈ MVS, denote by [f x ] the equivalence class of f x with respect to ≈; i.e., We can now state and prove the result of this subsection.
Proposition 2. The pair (MVS/ ≈ [ ])
is a complete lattice.
x n sup
and
Observe that if , any median voter scheme f x such that x 1 = x 2 = a and x n = x n+1 = b is more manipulable than any other MVS outside this class. Observe that this class includes all efficient median voting schemes except f 1 and f n and it has the property that the set of options left open by any preference is the full set [a b] and, hence, its admissible domain is the smallest one. As soon as the extreme fixed ballots move toward more intermediate alternatives, the options sets left open by any preference become smaller and therefore more non-single-peaked preferences are admissible in the domain of the corresponding median voter scheme so as to remain non-manipulable. Thus, although somehow disappointing, the class of unbiased median voter schemes is the most manipulable one precisely because it is more sensible to agents' preferences (the options that they leave open are larger). Finally, if n ≤ 3 and f x ∈ MVS is nonconstant, then [f x ] = {f x }. Thus, the pair (MVS ) is like a complete lattice (it is not because the equivalence class of constant median voter schemes is not degenerated). 
Generalized median voter schemes
Median voter schemes are anonymous. All agents have the same power to influence the outcome of a given median voter scheme f x , although this power depends on the distribution of its associated fixed ballots x = (x 1 x n+1 ). Generalized median voter schemes admit the possibility that different agents may have different power to influence its outcome. This power will be described by a monotonic family of fixed ballots, one for each coalition (subset) of agents. To develop a useful intuition to understand the class of all generalized median voter schemes, consider first the case n = 2. Given a monotonic family of fixed ballots {p {1 2} p {1} p {2} p {∅} }, one for each coalition of agents, such that
Observe that r f = [p {1 2} p {∅} ]. We can interpret this function as a way to assign to agents 1 and 2 the power to select the alternative in the subset r f = [p {1 2} p {∅} ]. For instance, agent 1 can make sure that the outcome is at most p {1} by voting below p {1} and at most τ(R 1 ) by voting above p {1} , and agent 1 is a dictator on [p {1} p {2} ] (i.e., f (R) = τ(R 1 ) whenever τ(R 1 ) ∈ [p {1} p {2} ]). It is easy to check that f can be rewritten as
To present the characterization of all strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences for all n ≥ 2, we say that a collection {p S } S∈2 N is a monotonic family of fixed ballots if (i) p S ∈ [a b] for all S ∈ 2 N and (ii) T ⊂ Q implies p Q ≤ p T . The characterization is the following.
Proposition 3 (Moulin 1980). A social choice function f : SP n → [a b] is strategy-proof and tops-only if and only if there exists a monotonic family of fixed ballots {p
The social choice functions identified in Proposition 3 are called generalized median voter schemes. A simple way to interpret them is as follows. Each generalized median voting scheme (and its associated monotonic family of fixed ballots) can be understood as a particular way to distribute the power among coalitions to influence the social choice. To see that, take an arbitrary coalition S and its fixed ballot p S . Then coalition S can make sure that, by all of its members reporting a top alternative below p S , the social choice will be at most p S , independently of the reported top alternatives of the members of the complementary coalition. 8 An alternative way to describe this distribution of power among coalitions is as follows. Fix a monotonic family of fixed ballots {p S } S∈2 N (i.e., a generalized median voter scheme) and take a vector of tops (τ(R 1 ) τ(R n )). Start at the left extreme of the interval a and push the outcome to the right until it reaches an alternative α for which the following two things happen simultaneously: (i) there exists a coalition of agents S such that all its members have reported a top alternative below or equal to α (i.e., τ(R i ) ≤ α for all i ∈ S) and (ii) the fixed ballot p S associated to S is also located below α (i.e., p S ≤ α). Median voter schemes are the anonymous subclass of generalized median voter schemes. Hence, the fixed ballots of any two coalitions with the same cardinality of any anonymous generalized median voter scheme are equal. From a monotonic family of fixed ballots {p S } S∈2 N associated to an anonymous generalized median voter scheme f : U n → [a b] we can identify the n + 1 ballots x 1 ≤ · · · ≤ x n+1 needed to describe f as a median voter scheme as follows: for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n + 1, x k = p S for all S ∈ 2 N such that #S = n − k + 1. Moreover, the onto social choice function f : U n → [a b], where agent j ∈ N is the dictator (i.e., for all R ∈ U n , f (R) = τ(R j )), can be described as a generalized median voter scheme by setting p T = a for all T ⊂ N such that j ∈ T and p S = b for all S ⊂ N such that j / ∈ S. Then, for any R ∈ U n , (i) max{τ(R j ) p {j} } = τ(R j ), τ(R j ) ≤ max i∈T {τ(R i ) p T } for any T ⊂ N such that j ∈ T , and (iii) max i∈S {τ(R i ) p S } = b for any S ⊂ N such that j / ∈ S. Thus,
Given a monotonic family of fixed ballots p = {p S } S⊂N , let f p denote the generalized median voter scheme associated to p.
Main result
Our main result will provide a systematic way to compare non-constant and nondictatorial generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. It turns out that to perform this comparison it is crucial to identify, for each agent i ∈ N, the subintervals where i is a non-dummy agent; i.e., the subset of alternatives that are eventually chosen at some profile but agent i is able to change the chosen alternative by reporting a different preference relation. Below, we define formally the general notion of a non-dummy agent at an alternative in a social choice function.
The lemma below characterizes non-dummyness at an alternative in a generalized median voter scheme f p : U n → [a b] in terms of the monotonic family of fixed ballots p. This characterization will be useful in the sequel. 
We are now ready to state the main result of the paper. 
hold for all i ∈ N if and only if fp is at least as manipulable as f p .
Before presenting three lemmata used in the proof of Theorem 2, a few remarks are in order.
First, conditions (7), (8), and (9) say that the relevant information to compare two generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability for agent i ∈ N lies in the values of the fixed ballots associated to coalitions N, N \ {i}, {i}, and {∅} and in i's non-dummy sets.
Second, observe that condition (9) is only relevant when p {i} < p N\{i} because if p N\{i} < p {i} , then [p {i} p N\{i} ] = ∅, and if p N\{i} = p {i} , then (9) follows from (7) and (8) Now, if x and y are the n + 1 vectors associated to f p and fp, respectively, then x 1 = p N , x 2 = p N\{i} , x n = p {i} , x n+1 = p {∅} , y 1 =p N , y 2 =p N\{i} , y n =p {i} , and y n+1 =p {∅} . Thus, conditions (7), (8), and (9) are equivalent to
which is what Theorem 1 says. Hence, Theorem 1 can be seen as a corollary of Theorem 2.
We will say that an interval
Whenever we refer to an interval as a non-dummy interval we exclude the possibility that the interval contains only one alternative. If i ∈ S with p S < p S\{i} , then [p S p S\{i} ] is a non-dummy interval for i in f p and we denote it by I S i . We will writeĪ S i when the median voter scheme used as a reference is fp instead of f p .
We state now the three lemmata, whose proofs are given in Appendix B, that will be used in the proof of Theorem 2. To simplify notation, given p = {p S } S⊂N and R i ∈ U , we denote o f p (R i ) by o p (R i ). 
Lemma 7. Let p = {p S } S⊂N andp = {p S } S⊂N be two monotonic families of fixed ballots such that f p and fp are not constant. Assume (7), (8), and (9) 
Let f p : U n → [a b] be a generalized median voter scheme and let i ∈ N be an agent. Denote the set of all α ∈ [a b] such that i is a dictator at α in f p , by DT i p . By Lemma 6, DT
Definition 8. Let p = {p S } S⊂N andp = {p S } S⊂N be two monotonic families of fixed ballots. The generalized median voter scheme f p : U n → [a b] is at least more (or more) dictatorial for i than the generalized median voter scheme fp : 
Similarly, and since DT ip = ∅,
Since f p and fp are comparable according to their manipulability and p {i} <p {i} ,
Thus, by Theorem 2, fp is more manipulable than f p .
9 Note thatÎ i does not necessarily have to be written asĪ S i for some S i.
Final remarks
Before moving to the omitted proofs we finish with two final remarks. The reader could ask about the meaning of applying a median voter scheme to the universal domain of preferences. 10 One could argue that if preferences are unrestricted it is like having no order on the set of alternatives. We also share this point of view. Under the universal domain of preferences median voter schemes lose their appeal. However, they still can be understood as a particular process for defining a specific subclass of social choice functions. Each ordering on the set of alternatives and each median voter scheme relative to this ordering defines a social choice function on the universal domain of preferences. This procedure becomes meaningful only when the structure and characteristics of the set of alternatives induce a natural order on it. But then if we want to design strategy-proof social choice functions on any domain that contains the set of single-peaked preferences (relative to this natural ordering), we have to look only inside the class of median voter schemes (this is a consequence of Moulin's 1980 characterization); otherwise, the social choice function would be manipulable. Our approach is relevant if agents, in addition to single-peaked preferences, may have additional preferences. The key point is to understand that a median voter scheme does not necessarily become manipulable under this larger domain. This depends very much on the identity of the agent, the particular properties of the additional preferences, and the median voter scheme under consideration. Lemmata 1 and 5 in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 identify exactly the class of extra preferences that an agent may have and simultaneously preserve the strategy-proofness of the median voter scheme. And again, this class depends very much on the particular median voter scheme and, if it is not anonymous, depends on the specific agent to whose domain these additional preferences have been included. Our main contribution is then to compare, in terms of their manipulability, some pairs of median voter schemes by using the setwise inclusion criterion on the corresponding extra classes of admissible preferences.
The second remark relates our comparability notion with two alternative notions proposed by Pathak and Sönmez (2013) to compare two different matching mechanisms (in school choice problems) according to their manipulability. Following Pathak and Sönmez (2013) , the profile R is vulnerable under the mechanism f if f is manipulable by some agent at R; i.e., there exist i ∈ N and R i ∈ U such that f (R i R −i ) P i f (R i R −i ). First, and following their definitions in Section 1, a mechanism f is at least as manipulable as mechanism g according to Pathak and Sönmez (at least as PS-manipulable as, for short) if any profile that is vulnerable under g is also vulnerable under f :
• If there exist i ∈ N and R i ∈ U such that g(R i R −i ) P i g(R i R −i ), then there exist j ∈ N and R j ∈ U such that f (R j R −j ) P j f (R j R −j ).
Second, and following their definitions in Section 3, a mechanism f is at least as strongly manipulable as mechanism g according to Pathak and Sönmez (at least as strongly PS-manipulable as, for short) if for any profile where g is vulnerable, f is also vulnerable by any agent who can manipulate g: 11
• If there exist i ∈ N and R i ∈ U such that g(R i R −i ) P i g(R i R −i ), then there exists
Remark 2. If f is at least as strongly PS-manipulable as g, then f is at least as PSmanipulable as g.
Proposition 5 below shows that if a generalized median voter scheme f is at least as PS-manipulable as a generalized median voter scheme g, then f is at least as manipulable as g.
Proposition 5. Let f and g be two generalized median voter schemes and assume that f is at least as PS-manipulable as g. Then f is at least as manipulable as g. 12
Proof. Fix i ∈ N and let R i ∈ M g i . This means that there exists
Since g is tops-only, we may assume that R −i ∈ SP n−1 . By assumption, there exist j ∈ N and R j ∈ U such that
If j = i, (10) implies that j can manipulate the generalized median voter scheme f at a profile R, where R j is a single-peaked preference, a contradiction with either Lemma 1 or Lemma 5. Hence, j = i. But then, by (10),
i , which implies that f is at least as manipulable as g.
Example 1 below shows that the reverse implication does not hold; i.e., there exist two median voter schemes f and g such that f is at least as manipulable as g but f is not at least as PS-manipulable as g (and, by Remark 2, f is not at least as strongly PS-manipulable as g). Therefore, Example 1 shows that our notion of being at least as manipulable as is different than the two notions proposed by Pathak and Sönmez (2013) . Example 1. Let n = 3 and let f x and f y be two median voter schemes associated to x = (0 1 2 1 2 1) and y = (0 0 1 1), respectively. By Theorem 1, and since [x 1 x n+1 ] ⊂ [y 1 y n+1 ] and [x 2 x n ] [y 2 y n ], f y is at least as manipulable as f x . On the one hand, consider any profile R = (R 1 R 2 R 3 ) ∈ U 3 and any preference R 3 ∈ U such that (i) τ(R i ) = 1 for i = 1 2, (ii) τ(R 3 ) = 4 . Therefore, f x (R 1 R 2 R 3 ) = 3 4 P 3 1 2 = f x (R) and, hence, R is vulnerable under f x . Moreover, f y (R) = 1 and R is not vulnerable under f y . Thus, f y is not at least as PS-manipulable as f x and, hence, by 11 Observe that the notions of "at least as PS-manipulable as" and "at least as strongly PS-manipulable as" are relative to the inclusion of the sets of vulnerable profiles, while our notion of "at least as manipulable as" is relative to the inclusion of the sets of manipulable preferences.
12 In light of Remark 2, the statement of Proposition 5 also holds after replacing "g is at least as PSmanipulable as f " by "g is at least as strongly PS-manipulable as f ."
Remark 2, f y is not at least as strongly PS-manipulable as f x . On the other hand, consider any profileR = (R 1 R 2 R 3 ) ∈ U 3 and any preferenceR 3 ∈ U such that (i) τ(
1 2 = f y (R) and, hence,R is vulnerable under f y . Thus, f x is not at least as PS-manipulable as f y and, hence, by Remark 2, f x is not at least as strongly PS-manipulable as f y . Therefore, f x and f y are not comparable according to the two notions proposed by Pathak and Sönmez (2013) . ♦ Example 1 illustrates the fact that our comparability notion is based on the inclusion of the maximal domains of preferences under which each of the two generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. In this case, the maximal domain of preferences under which f y is strategy-proof is the set of single-peaked preferences on [0 1] while f x admits a much larger maximal domain, the union of the three sets:
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1. (⇒) Suppose there exists α * ∈ r f x such that R i is not single-peaked on o x (R i ) ∪ {τ(R i ) α * }. We will prove that there exist R i ∈ U and R −i ∈ U n−1 such that f x (R i R −i ) P i f x (R i R −i ). We will divide the proof into three different cases.
Case 1. Suppose α * ∈ o x (R i ) and there exists β ∈ o x (R i ) such that α * < β < τ(R i ) and α * P i β; the other case where τ(R i ) < α * < β and β P i α * is similar and therefore is omitted. LetR ∈ U n be such that τ(R j ) = α * for all j ∈ N. Since α * ∈ o x (R i ) and f x is a median voter scheme, f x (R i R −i ) = α * . Similarly, letR ∈ U n be such that τ(
Now, let R i ∈ U be such that τ(
Then, by (12) and the definition of f x ,
Hence, by (11),
Thus, f x is manipulable by i at R i with any R i with the property that τ(
Case 2. Suppose α * / ∈ o x (R i ) and there exists β ∈ o x (R i ) such that α * < β < τ(R i ) and α * P i β; the other case where τ(R i ) < β < α * and α * P i β proceeds similarly and is therefore omitted. LetR ∈ U n be such that τ(R j ) = β for all j ∈ N. Since β ∈ o x (R i ),
LetR ∈ U n be such that τ(R j ) = β for all j ∈ N. If there exist S ⊂ N \ {i} and j / ∈ S such that
holds, the proof proceeds as in Case 1. Hence, assume that there do not exist S ⊂ N \ {i} and j / ∈ S satisfying (14). Let N \ {i} = {j 1 j n−1 }. Then
consider S n−1 = {j 1 j 2 j n−3 } j = j n−2 / ∈ S n−1 and ¬(14)
Hence, as α * P i β,
Since α * ∈ r f x , f x (R i R −i ) = α * . Thus, by (15), f x (R i R −i ) P i f x (R i R −i ), which means that f x is manipulable by i at R i with anyR i such that τ(R i ) = α * . Case 3. Suppose α * / ∈ o x (R i ) and there exists β ∈ o x (R i ) such that β < α * < τ(R i ) and β P i α * ; the other case where τ(R i ) < α * < β and β P i α * proceeds similarly and is therefore omitted. We will prove that this case is not possible. Consider the profileR such that τ(R j ) = α * for all j ∈ N. Since α * / ∈ o x (R i ), β ∈ o x (R i ), and o x (R i ) is an interval (see Lemma 2), f (R i R −i ) < α * . Furthermore, and since α * ≤ τ(R i ), f x (R i R −i ) ≤ f x (R i R −i ) < α * . Hence, f x (R) < α. Thus, α * / ∈ r f x , which contradicts the initial hypothesis.
(⇐) Suppose f x is manipulable by i at R i ; that is, there exist R i ∈ U and R −i ∈ U n−1 such that
Consider the case τ(R i ) < τ(R i ); the other case is similar and therefore is omitted. We distinguish among three different cases.
Since f x is a median voter scheme and τ(R i ) < τ(R i ),
, which also contradicts (16).
Case 3: f x (R i R −i ) < τ(R i ). Since τ(P i ) < τ(R i ) and (16) 
Proof of Lemma 2. We divide the proof into three cases.
Case 1: τ(R i ) < x 1 . The case x n+1 < τ(R i ) is symmetric and its proof proceeds similarly; therefore, it is omitted. We prove that o x (R i ) = [x 1 x n ]. Let α ∈ o x (R i ) be arbitrary. Then there exists R −i ∈ U n−1 such that
If y s * < x 1 , and since τ(R i ) < x 1 ≤ · · · ≤ x n+1 , #{s ∈ {1 2n + 1} | y s ≥ y s * } ≥ n + 2. Hence, α = y s * . If x n < y s * and since τ(R i ) < x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ · · · ≤ x n , #{s ∈ {1 2n + 1} | y s ≤ y s * } ≥ n + 2. Hence, α = y s * . Thus, α ∈ [x 1 x n ]. Now, let α ∈ [x 1 x n ],R i = R i , and, for all j ∈ N \ {i}, letR j ∈ U be such that τ(R j ) = α.
Case 2: x 1 ≤ τ(R i ) < x 2 . The case x n < τ(R i ) ≤ x n+1 is symmetric and its proof proceeds similarly; therefore, it is omitted. We prove that o x (R i ) = [τ(R i ) x n+1 ]. Let α ∈ o x (R i ) be arbitrary. Then there exists R −i ∈ U n−1 such that
Case 3:
If y s * < x 2 , and since x 2 ≤ · · · ≤ x n+1 and x 2 ≤ τ(R i ), we have that #{s ∈ {1
2n + 1} | y s ≥ y s * } ≥ n + 2. Hence, α = y s * . If x n < y s * , and since x 1 ≤ · · · ≤ x n and τ(R i ) ≤ x n , we have that #{s ∈ {1
2n + 1} | y s ≤ y s * } ≥ n + 2. Hence, α = y s * . Thus, α ∈ [x 2 x n ]. Now let α ∈ [x 2 x n ],R i = R i , and, for all j ∈ N \ {i}, letR j ∈ U be such that
2n + 1} | y s ≥ α} ≥ n + 1. Furthermore and since
Proof of Lemma 3. We divide the proof into five cases.
Case 1:
Case 4:
Hence, o x (R i ) ⊂ o y (R i ).
Appendix B
We start with two preliminary notions and several remarks.
First, a generalized median voter scheme f p : U n → [a b] can alternatively be represented by a monotonic family of right fixed ballots p r = {p r S } S∈2 N , where
. Second, a non-dummy interval I i is a maximal non-dummy interval for i if there is no non-dummy interval I i such that I i I i . Since the number of coalitions that contain a player is finite, any maximal non-dummy interval I i can be written as the union of a family of intervals; namely,
K. Before moving to the proof of the four lemmata used to prove Theorem 2, we state without proof the following facts. p S ≤ α. Suppose otherwise, α < p S ; then max j∈S {τ(R j ) p S } = p S > α. By the definition of S and f , f (R i R −i ) > α, a contradiction with f (R i R −i ) = α. Now we prove that α < p S\{i} . Suppose otherwise, p S\{i} ≤ α. For all j ∈ S \ {i}, τ(R j ) = τ(R j ) ≤ α. Hence,
Case 2: f (R i R −i ) < α = f (R i R −i ). The proof proceeds symmetrically to Case 1 using the right fixed ballots representation of f .
(⇐) Assume there exists S ⊂ N such that i ∈ S, p S < p S\{i} , and p S ≤ α ≤ p S\{i} . We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: p S ≤ α < p S\{i} . Let R ∈ U n be such that τ(R j ) = α for all j ∈ S and τ(
Proof of Lemma 5. We will denote f p and o p (R i ) simply by f and o(R i ), respectively.
(⇒) Assume f is not manipulable by i at R i and let
Case 1: α * ∈ (o(R i ) ∩ I S i ) ∪ {τ(R i )} and α * < β ≤ τ(R i ) (if β < α * , the proof is similar, changing the role of α * and β). We will show that β R i α * . If β = τ(R i ), the statement holds immediately. Assume β < τ(R i ). Then α * β ∈ I S i . Hence and since α * < β, p S ≤ α * < p S\{i} . Consider any R −i ∈ U n−1 with the property that for every j ∈ N \ {i},
LetR ∈ U n be such that τ(R j ) = β for all j ∈ N \ {i} and τ(
We proceed by distinguishing between two subcases. Subcase 1.1:
Observe that α * < α * 1 < β and since f is not manipulable by i at R i , α
Since {p S | S ⊂ N} is finite, we apply successively the previous argument starting with α * 1 < β and obtaining
Case 2: α * ∈ (o(R i ) ∩ I S i ) ∪ {τ(R i )} and τ(R i ) ≤ β < α * . The proof proceeds as in Case 1 using the right fixed ballots representation of f .
Case 3: α * / ∈ o(R i ) and α * < β ≤ τ(R i ) (if τ(R i ) ≤ β < α * , the proof is similar using the right fixed ballots representation of f ). We will show that β R i α * . If β = τ(R i ), the statement holds immediately. Assume β < τ(R i ) and consider any profileR ∈ U n , where, for every j ∈ N, τ(R j ) = α * . Since α * ∈ I S i ⊂ r f , f (R) = α * . We will show that
. Therefore, by Case 1, β R i α . By transitivity of R i , β R i α * . Case 4: α * / ∈ o(R i ) and β < α * ≤ τ(R i ) (if τ(R i ) ≤ α * < β, the proof is similar, changing the role of α * by β). We will show that this case is not possible. Consider any profile R ∈ U n such that τ(R j ) = α * for all j ∈ N. Since α * / ∈ o(R i ), β ∈ o(R i ), and o(R i ) is an interval, f (R i R −i ) < α * . Furthermore, as α * ≤ τ(R i ) and Remark 1 holds,
∈ r f , which contradicts the fact that α * ∈ I S i . (⇐) Assume f is manipulable by i at R i . Then there exist R i ∈ U and R −i ∈ U n−1 such that
We assume that τ(R i ) < τ(R i ) (if τ(R i ) < τ(R i ), the proof is similar using the right fixed ballots representation of f ). Set R = (R i R −i ). We distinguish among three cases. Case 1: τ(R i ) < f (R). Since f is a generalized median voter scheme and τ(R i ) < τ(R i ), f (R ) = f (R), which contradicts (17).
Case 2: τ(R i ) = f (R). Then f (R) R i f (R ), which also contradicts (17).
Set S ≡S ∪ {i}. Hence, S = {j ∈ N | τ(R j ) ≤ α * }. Suppose p S > α * . Then, for all S ⊂ S max j∈S {τ(R j ) p S } ≥ p S ≥ p S > α * and for all S * S, max j∈S * {τ(R j ) p S * } > α * because if j / ∈ S, then τ(R j ) > α * . Thus, α * < f (R ), which is a contradiction. Hence p S ≤ α * . Therefore, i ∈ S and p S ≤ α * < β ≤ p S\{i} since S \ {i} =S and (18) hold. Thus, there exist a non-dummy interval [p S p S\{i} ] and
The proof of Lemma 6 is omitted since it consists of verifying that the option set can be written as stated.
Proof of Lemma 7. Let i ∈ S ⊂ N, let I S i be a non-dummy interval for i in f p , and let α * ∈ I S i be arbitrary. The proof proceeds by looking at different cases that can be grouped into two main cases depending on whether p N\{i} ≤ p {i} (Case 1) or p {i} < p N\{i} (Case 2). Let R i ∈ U and α β γ ∈ [a b] be such that (i) σ 1 < α < β < γ < η 1 , (ii) τ(R i ) = α, (iii) γ P i β, and (iv) if ρ δ ∈ [a b] and η 1 < ρ < δ, then η 1 R i ρ R i δ. and (iv) if ρ δ ∈ [a b] \ {γ} and α < ρ < δ or δ < ρ < α, then ρ R i δ. 
